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a b s t r a c t 
Due to conventional gender norms, women are more likely to be in charge of childcare than men. From an 
employer’s perspective, in their fertile age they are also at “risk ” of pregnancy. Both factors potentially affect 
hiring practices of firms. We conduct a large-scale correspondence test in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, 
sending out approx. 9000 job applications, varying job candidate’s personal characteristics such as marital status 
and age of children. We find evidence that, for part-time jobs, married women with older kids, who likely finished 
their childbearing cycle and have more projectable childcare chores than women with very young kids, are at a 
significant advantage vis-à-vis other groups of women. At the same time, married, but childless applicants, who 
have a higher likelihood to become pregnant, are at a disadvantage compared to single, but childless applicants to 
part-time jobs. Such effects are not present for full-time jobs presumably because, by applying to these in contrast 
to part-time jobs, women signal that they have arranged for external childcare. 
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2 Mincer’s (1962) path-breaking work on the labour supply of married women 
focuses on the number of hours supplied by mothers as a function of children’s 
age (and husband’s earnings), i.e. Mincer highlights the issue of compatibility 
of hours of work with the presence of children of different ages. Mincer and Po- 
lachek (1974) , apart from deriving different human capital investment and occu- 
pational choices depending on expected work-interruptions, stress how families 
see childcare and labour supply as a joint optimization problem: “the behavior 
of the family unit implies a division of labor within it. ” (p.S76). 
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20. Introduction 
Females and males still have very different experiences in the labor
arket, for example with respect to wages, career paths or assignment of
asks. Differences in terms of pay and career paths are not only the sub-
ect of debate in the popular press but are well documented in the aca-
emic literature. Goldin (2014) argues that, in the last century, the roles
f men and women have greatly converged and that the “last chapter ”
as been opened for women to achieve full labor market equality. 1 Even
f the situation of women in the labor market has markedly improved
ver the last decades, the question of why there is a gender asymmetry
n the first place has not yet been fully settled. 
One possible reason for gender inequality, that receives substantial
onsideration in the literature, is motherhood and its effects in the la-
or market. For example, Kleven et al. forthcoming recently showed
hat, despite considerable gender convergence, in Denmark the pres-
nce of children accounts for most of the remaining earnings inequality
etween men and women in the labor market. Their empirical approach
as adopted by Kleven et al. (2019a) who examined child penalties in
ifferent countries and found particularly negative effects of children on
arnings in the German-speaking countries that are also examined in this
tudy. Sometimes such earnings differences are interpreted as reflecting∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: s.o.becker@warwick.ac.uk (S.O. Becker), ana.fernandes@bfh.ch
1 Blau and Kahn (2017) , for example, show that the gender wage gap in the US has
layed an important role for the difference in wages, this was much less the case in 2
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927-5371/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access ariscrimination. Of course, depending on the data and empirical strategy
sed, identification problems when interpreting findings on child penal-
ies may occur. Already the early human capital literature (especially the
ork of Mincer, 1962 and Mincer and Polachek, 1974 ) emphasized that
hoices concerning childcare, labor supply, occupation and human cap-
tal investments of (future) mothers could generate the same patterns in
he data. 2 As a result, numerous endogeneity issues (e.g., concerning ef-
ort at work, selection into work) occur in non-experimental data (e.g.,
unze, 2008 ) that make the identification of discrimination in wage set-
ing difficult. 
In this study, we therefore resort to an experimental setting that al-
ows for full randomization of motherhood status and thereby enables us
o clearly identify the occurrence of discrimination in hiring. The results (A. Fernandes), Doris.Weichselbaumer@jku.at (D. Weichselbaumer). 
 decreased from 1980 to 2010; however, while in 1980 differences in education 
010. 
l 2019 
ticle under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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i  ill thus allow us to test whether also demand-side effects (employers’
ehavior) play a role in the lower labor market participation rates of
omen at different stages of family formation. 3 
Discrimination is commonly defined as a situation where individu-
ls of identical productivity are treated differently because of the de-
ographic group to which they belong. “Taste-based ” discrimination is
ooted in preferences ( Becker, 1957 ), whereas “statistical discrimina-
ion ” ( Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973 ) is considered a rational response of
mployers to missing information about the applicant’s productivity. 4 
In our experiment, we examine two routes how motherhood may
ncourage statistical discrimination by firms. First, one “risk ” (from the
mployers’ perspective) that falls 100% on females, and not on males, is
he risk of pregnancy. This comes with costs to employers who need to
nd at least temporary replacement for female employees giving birth. 
Second, traditional gender norms assign childcare responsibilities
rimarily to women. Because women have a higher likelihood of dealing
ith household chores related to childcare – for example they may have
o take a day off to take care of a sick child – firms may find hiring fe-
ales costlier than otherwise similar males. Among females, those with
lder children may be less likely to have to deal with childcare issues,
s older children are in school and/or less likely to suffer from health
ssues that require parental attention. 
To test these possible effects of potential pregnancy as well as child-
are, in our study, we look at the hiring chances of women who are in
ifferent phases of their family formation. We conduct a correspondence
esting experiment in the German-speaking countries, where we send
ut applications that signal identical productivity but a different family
tatus. Our study relies on the fact that in the countries examined, Ger-
any, Switzerland and Austria, résumés routinely include detailed in-
ormation about the job candidate’s personal characteristics, such as age,
ender, marital status and number of children. As such, in our experi-
ent, our thirty-year-old fictitious job candidates are randomly given
arying household demographics, ranging from being single and child-
ess or being married and childless, to being married and having two
oung or two older children. One additional profile provides no infor-
ation on household composition. Our candidates apply to secretarial
nd accounting jobs in all three countries, answering job advertisements
osted on internet job portals. 
We contrast employers’ reactions to our candidates in full- and part-
ime positions, because applicants to full-time jobs implicitly signal that
hey have childcare arrangements in place, while those applying to part-
ime jobs indicate that they are looking for a job that is compatible
ith childcare duties. Hence, we expect employers to be more concerned
bout marital status and age of children for those applying to part-time
obs. Our findings are in line with these hypotheses. 
Our study includes approx. 9000 observations (i.e. job applications),
overing the largest cities in three different countries, full- and part-
ime jobs, as well as female and male applicants. Experimental meth-
ds to detect discrimination, such as audit studies and correspondence
esting, are able to overcome some limitations present in other empir-
cal approaches (see Neumark, 2018 ). However, Heckman and Siegel-
an (1993) show that the measurement of discrimination from these
tudies may be biased if the employer does not observe all determi-
ants of productivity. Neumark (2012) proposes an empirical method
o address this problem, which allows for the computation of unbiased
stimates of discrimination. Our results are robust to this correction. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We next present a literature re-
iew. Section 3 describes the institutional context of our study, and3 Female labour force participation still falls short of the male labor force 
articipation in most countries. The female-to-male ratio in labor force partici- 
ation rates is well below 1 in all European countries. In the German-speaking 
ountries Germany, Switzerland and Austria, the ratio was 0.806, 0.810 and 
.806, respectively, in 2012. See http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/labour-force- 
articipation-rate-female-male-ratio (accessed 4 March 2019). 
4 See also the discussion in Guryan and Charles (2013) . 
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140 ection 4 the implementation of our study. In Section 5 , we present
ur results. In Section 6 , we conclude by discussing the results and their
olicy implications. 
. Previous studies and differences to the current experiment 
Our study is part of the burgeoning literature of field experiments,
amely audit studies and correspondence testing (see Bertrand and Du-
o, 2017; Neumark, 2018; Baert, 2018; Rich, 2014 ). In correspondence
esting, résumés of applicants that are matched in all relevant quali-
cations, like schooling and job experience, but which differ with re-
pect to their demographic characteristics, are sent out in response to
ob advertisements. While quite a few correspondence tests examined
ex discrimination more generally in the past, the literature is surpris-
ngly scarce when it comes to the question of fertility. 5 We next describe
hose studies in detail. 
Firth (1982) conducted a correspondence test for accountants in the
K. He compared the success rates of males and females who were mar-
ied or single; married individuals were further presented with and with-
ut children. The success rates of males were always higher than those
f females and the difference widened in the presence of children. 
In their correspondence study in France, Duguet and Petit (2005) and
etit (2007) varied the age and family status of their applicants, com-
rising three types: 25 year olds and childless, 37 year olds, single and
hildless, and 37 year olds, married with two children. They further
ompared males and females along those types. The different age groups
ere meant to indicate different probabilities of future childbearing.
he authors found no evidence of discrimination against older women
elative to older men. However, the younger female types received call-
acks significantly less frequently than the younger men, when applying
o highly qualified jobs, which the authors attribute to higher mater-
ity costs in these occupations. Barto š (2015) used a similar design for
is correspondence study, conducted in the Czech Republic. It consid-
red younger (25 year olds) childless males and females, and older (41
ear olds) males and females, who were either childless or had two chil-
ren instead. All job applicants were married. He found no difference in
verage callback rates among the younger male and female applicants
ut older women were preferred to older men. In line with Duguet and
etit (2005) , Barto š (2015) identified weak evidence for a motherhood
enalty for younger women, but only when applying to highly qualified
ositions. 
Correll et al. (2007) report both on a lab experiment and on a cor-
espondence test, where same-gender applications (both female or both
ale) with and without children were sent to employers. In both exper-
ments, childless women were preferred to other demographic profiles,
nd mothers adversely treated compared to fathers. 6 With a similar de-
ign, Bygren et al. (2017) tested parenthood effects in Sweden in one
f the most recent studies. However, they did not find any systematic
iscrimination based on sex or parental status. 
A different design was used in the correspondence test of
uguet et al. (2017) , who sought to identify a maternity penalty by
omparing employer response rates across short- and long-term posi-
ion within an occupation. They found evidence of a career interruption
enalty in one of the three occupations examined. 
Baert (2014) provided more indirect evidence compatible with a
enalty for potential maternity in an experiment that compared hir-
ng chances of young as well as middle-aged heterosexual and lesbian5 As Bertrand and Duflo (2017) write: “A topic of interest for future work would 
e to apply the correspondence method to measure the extent to which a bias exists 
gainst women with children, or against young women who may have children in the 
uture. ” (p. 325). 
6 In the field study, childless women were called back 2.1 more times com- 
ared to mothers. In the lab experiment, childless women were recommended 
or hire 1.8 times more frequently than mothers. 
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9 As a result, labor market participation rates for women with children under 
3 years are somewhat higher in Switzerland than in the other countries (see 
WSI Genderdatenportal, 2018; Bundesamt für Statistik, 2017; Statistik Austria, 
2016 ). According to the OECD Family Database (n.d.) , also participation rates 
of 0–2-year-olds in childcare and pre-school service are higher in Switzerland 
in 2014 (38%, Germany: 32.3%, Austria: 19.2%). omen. While in his study, lesbian women were preferred to heterosex-
als when they were young (and thus in childbearing age) there was no
ifference for middle-aged women of different sexual orientation. 7 
ifferences to our study 
As this overview over existing correspondence tests has shown, many
revious studies compared women with and without children. However,
ot knowing more about a woman’s family situation than the presence
f children, it is difficult to assess her likelihood of pregnancy. Some
uthors try to address this problem by varying the age of the applicant
nd thus indicating whether a woman is still in her childbearing years. 8 
owever, over the life-cycle also non-fertility related productivity char-
cteristics change, making it difficult to disentangle the effect of fertility
n the empirical results. 
Also, when motherhood is indicated in a correspondence test, it may
e perceived to make childbearing less likely, but it simultaneously sig-
als that the woman possibly has to handle childcare chores. As a result,
or an employer it is unclear whether a mother is attractive (because she
as already finished her fertility cycle), or unattractive because she may
e tied up with childcare issues leading to a lack of focus at work and
otential absences. 
In this paper, we try to avoid some of the above-mentioned problems.
irst, we abstain from varying age so as not to introduce any confound-
ng factors affecting invitation rates. All our candidates are therefore of
dentical age but at different stages of their family formation cycle. Sec-
nd, we use much more nuanced indicators for potential motherhood
nd childcare chores. In particular, we work with single candidates and
arrieds without kids, who differ in their childbearing probability. Fur-
her, we make use of the fact that childcare chores vary with the age
f the children – they are especially high for young children who, e.g.,
re more likely to become sick and in need for immediate care. In our
tudy, we therefore indicate the age of the children to allow employers
o assess the level of childcare required. 
In addition to extensive indicators describing the family situation,
hile previous studies focused on full time jobs only, we also exploit
ifferences between full- and part-time jobs. Applying to a part-time job
ndicates that a woman seeks to reconcile work and family life. We ex-
ect that employers offering part-time work find their jobs particularly
uitable for women with (older) children, while they are nevertheless
orried about maternity leave. 
Apart from its novel design, our correspondence study is also the first
esting for realized or expected fertility effects in the German-speaking
ountries. As mentioned, the breadth of information routinely provided
n applicants’ CVs allows us to inconspicuously place our family situa-
ion cues before employers. 
. Context of the current study 
.1. Job applications in German-speaking countries 
The German-speaking countries provide an ideal context to experi-
entally analyze discrimination based on (potential) parenthood. First,
he application process is rather “traditional ”: in comparison to other
ountries, e.g., the UK, few firms work with employer-provided applica-
ion forms which make testing identical applications in a résumé study7 Baert et al. (2016) found that hiring discrimination of women was higher 
hen the new job was higher in the job ladder than the one currently held. They 
uggest that, because of higher investment costs at higher occupational levels, 
his may be a manifestation of the career penalty of motherhood. 
8 Also Carlsson and Eriksson (2017) highlight labor market disruptions due 
o family formation and child care as one reason why women and men may 
ave different age profiles in callback rates. Note that in our study, we hold age 
onstant. 
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141 mpossible. Second, and more importantly, applications provide exten-
ive information on a candidate, not only concerning qualifications but
lso personal characteristics ( Weichselbaumer, forthcoming ). The cru-
ial feature which we rely on is the fact that marital status and number
f children are routinely included in the résumés. In our field experi-
ent, we explore this possibility and convey information on the résumé
bout the age and number of children as well as on the marital status
f the applicant. The fact that typical job application packages consist
f a cover letter, the résumé, scans of certificates (school, apprentice-
hips, languages, etc.) and thereby provide detailed information on ed-
cational achievements and other human capital characteristics, renders
tatistical discrimination on other dimensions less likely. 
.2. Institutional features in Austria, Germany and Switzerland 
The countries examined differ with respect to their paternal leave
nd benefit policies (for details, see Appendix ). In Austria and Germany,
olicies are relatively generous and allow parents to take a break from
he duty to work for up to three years without termination of the employ-
ent in exchange for the suspension of pay. Different models of paternal
enefits can be claimed which cover at least a part of the paternal leave
eriod. In Switzerland, women are only entitled to maternal benefits for
4 weeks after birth and protected from firing until 16 weeks after the
irth of a child. 9 
There is a large literature that examines the effect of paternity
eave and child care policies (for an overview see Olivetti and Petron-
olo, 2017 ). 10 However, Kleven et al. (2019b) show (for the setting of
ustria) that such policies have little or no effect, at least on penal-
ies with respect to women’s wages in the long run. Instead, as the au-
hors illustrate in a different paper ( Kleven et al., 2019a ), long run child
enalties in earnings strongly correlate with gender norms. Thus, in their
tudy, the particularly traditional gender norms in the German-speaking
ountries (they look at Germany and Austria specifically) explain the
arge child penalties observed there. 
Indeed, gender norms are relatively traditional in all three coun-
ries examined. For example, data from the 2012 sample of the Inter-
ational Social Survey Program (ISSP) on Family and Changing Gender
oles show that, among those answering the respective questions, in
erman-speaking countries, respondents feel more strongly than in the
U15 that for women work and family is incompatible. 11 In Austria,
nly 1.97% of respondents think that a mother of children in preschool
ge should work full-time. In Switzerland, that percentage is 5.33%,
nd in Germany 14.26%. 12 In contrast, in the EU15, the corresponding
gure is 17.10%. Looking at whether women should work when their
oungest kid is at school, the pattern looks very similar: in Austria,
4.47% think women should work full-time in that case, in Germany
0.45%, in Switzerland 11.47%, and in the EU15 47.05%. 
The conservative gender norms are also reflected in the high rates of
emale part-time work (in 2015, according to Eurostat (2019) : Germany
6.6%, Switzerland: 60.6%, Austria: 46.8%, EU-average: 31.1%), which10 Of course, family policies may backfire and result in negative labour market 
utcomes for women in terms of hiring, wages and promotions, as is well docu- 
ented in the literature. We discuss this issue, with particular consideration of 
qual pay laws, in the Appendix . 
11 The EU15 provide a natural comparison for Western European countries. 
owever, note that the ISSP questions were not asked in Greece, Italy and Lux- 
mbourg, thus, the “EU15 ” are only approximated. 
12 Note that the German figures include the former Communist East with more 
rogressive gender norms, while our experiment ran in West-German cities and 
erlin. As a result, the respective number is likely to be lower there. 
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Fig. 1. Age difference between 2nd and 3rd child. 
Notes: Data from Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), year 
2014. Displaying age difference between 2nd and 3rd 
child for mothers aged 20–40 years, with at least 3 
children. 
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t  s particularly prevalent for mothers with a partner. For example, in
witzerland, conditional on having a job, 58.6% of childless, partnered
omen (age 25–54) work full time. This fraction drops to 19.4% for
others of similar demographics whose youngest child is 4–12 years old,
ith the remaining 80.6% working part-time. 13 These numbers portray
art-time as a form of labor market participation strongly associated
ith the presence of children. 
. Design of the experiment 
.1. Family types 
Because in other countries personal information about an applicant
s usually relatively scarce, previous studies typically had to convey fer-
ility information indirectly through varying applicant age and mari-
al status. For example, previous studies inferred fertility discrimination
rom comparing sex discrimination between old and young applicants.
owever, age may have different effects by gender independently of fer-
ility. We therefore deliberately held the age of our job candidates con-
tant (at 30 years) and added a broad range of constellations regarding
ousehold composition to indicate different probabilities of pregnancy
nd childcare obligations. Our applicants included female and male in-
ividuals that were single and childless (default), married and childless,
nd parents whose two children were either “young ” (3 and 5 years) or
old ” (7 and 9 years). By differentiating between these types, we sought
o isolate different facets of fertility-related costs, in particular by distin-
uishing between potential fertility (in the comparison of single types
ith those who are married but have no children) from costs related
o child-related chores given realized fertility (comparing between the
arents of younger and of older children). 
The average fertility rate in Switzerland and Austria is 1.5 and 1.4 in
ermany (see UN World Population Prospects, 2015 ). Consequently, the
isk of pregnancy is highest for the married, childless female, small for
others of two young children (given the low average fertility rate), and
lose to zero for the mothers of two older children. The latter is because
arents of older children are more hesitant to start the child bearing and
earing cycle anew. This is shown for the German Socio-Economic Panel13 Authors’ calculations based on data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 
able su-d-01.07.05.07 for 2017. 
m
3
142 GSOEP), the richest panel data set in the German-speaking countries,
n Fig. 1 , where we plot the age difference between the 2nd and 3rd
hild for women (aged 20–40) who have 3 or more children (in the year
014). As can be seen, more than 90% of women have their 3rd child
ess than 7 years after the 2nd. To the extent that employers are aware
f this pattern, they will almost certainly assume that a woman with two
lder children (aged 7 and 9) in our experiment is not going to have a
hird child. 
Comparing parents of younger and older children, the former are
ore prone to having to deal with child-related chores and illnesses than
he latter. Again, this is illustrated with data from the GSOEP in Fig. 2 ,
hich shows that, in fact, both mothers and fathers of younger children
ave a higher number of absences due to sick children: the number of
ays absent because of a sick child are nearly double as high for parents
f two young children than for parents of two older children. Mothers,
owever, have more child-related absences than fathers. 
It follows from here that parents of older children appear to be ideal
andidates from the point of view of fertility-related costs to the em-
loyer: they convey low pregnancy risk and low costs associated with
hildcare chores. Parents of two younger children likewise have a very
ow pregnancy risk but potentially face child-related chores. Of course,
ingle women without children may get pregnant in the future, how-
ver, at the point of hiring, they have no conventional family obliga-
ions at all. For this reason, we have no prior whether single women or
omen with older children are preferred by employers. We do, how-
ver, hypothesize that, first, single and childless candidates outrank the
arried and childless, as their risk of pregnancy is lower, 14 and, second,
hat parents of older children are preferred by the employer to parents
f younger children who may require more care work. We cannot really
ign how employers would rank the married and childless relative to
he parents of small children. This depends on how high the costs of a
otential pregnancy are perceived to be for the former, relative to the
osts of the already present chores with small children, for the latter. 
In German-speaking countries, women with children seeking to im-
rove their job opportunities sometimes include a sentence stating that
hey do not plan to increase their family size. The literal translation of a14 According to data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, childless, but 
arried women are likely to have children sooner than childless singles aged 
0. 
S.O. Becker, A. Fernandes and D. Weichselbaumer Labour Economics 59 (2019) 139–152 
Fig. 2. Days absent at work. 
Notes: Data from Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), year 
2014. Displaying days absent from work in previ- 
ous year. Reasons displayed are absences because of 
own sickness, absences because of sick child, and 
other/unknown reasons. 
c  
p  
t  
y  
o  
c  
m  
i  
e
m
l
w
a
j  
m
 
v  
m  
a  
t  
w  ommon statement ( “Familienplanung abgeschlossen ”) used is “family
lanning completed ”, however, “family completed ” may better capture
he meaning. Because mothers of young children may be perceived as
et having some probability to have a third child, in a random subset
f this group this sentence family completed was included in their appli-
ation letter. The goal was to test, whether the inclusion of such state-
ents, sometimes recommended by guidebooks and eagerly discussed
n online forums, 15 has an empirical basis and helps mothers seeking a15 Examples for respective recommendations and online debates can be found, 
.g., under the following links: https://www.karinleitmueller.at/bewerben- 
it-kind , https://essentialtimes.wordpress.com/2011/09/27/bewerbung-3- 
ebenslauf , https://www.netmoms.de/fragen/detail/bewerbung-schreiben- 
ie-die-kinder-optimal-einbringen-22842483 , http://www.parents.at/forum/ 
rchive/index.php/t-57132.html 
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143 ob, even though from an economic perspective this sentence may be
erely considered cheap talk. 
Finally, we included one additional “family type ” that did not pro-
ide any information on a candidate’s family situation. The “no infor-
ation ” candidate was incorporated to check whether candidates can
void discrimination by leaving out information on their family life in
heir résumé. Alternatively, it could be that firms treat such applications
ith suspicion. Since previous research has often shown opposing effects
f family status for men and women (e.g., Firth, 1982 ), applications for
oth sexes were sent out. 
.2. Full-time vs. part-time jobs 
While full-time employment is the norm for men, in German-
peaking countries, a significant share of women work part-time (see
bove). In the occupations we consider, accountants and secretaries,
S.O. Becker, A. Fernandes and D. Weichselbaumer Labour Economics 59 (2019) 139–152 
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17 Data collection started in March 2013, with Switzerland, and was soon ex- 
tended to Germany, in April that year. Data collection for Austria (Vienna) was 
initiated in June 2014. Austria was not a country in our initial research plan 
but the similarities in the job application procedure suggested that an extension 
to that country would serve as a useful comparison to the other two German 
speaking countries. Regarding 2015, data were essentially only being collected 
for Austria, though one city in Germany (Berlin) and one in Switzerland (Zurich) 
were also included in the continuation of the study to provide a benchmark to 
Austrian data. Despite data being collected for almost a year for Austria, we 
were not able to gather a high number of observations. 
18 Those critical of correspondence studies point out the costs to employers of 
having to deal with ‘fake applications’ which is why we decline invitations for 
job interviews right away. Yet, we would like to highlight that the German Fed- 
eral Antidiscrimination Agency (2011) explicitly validates the legality of corre- 0% of women work part-time, according to data from the German
ocio-Economic Panel. Given the prevalence of part-time employment
or women, we sent out applications to both full-time and part-time job
dvertisements, which the previous literature has not addressed. In the
erman speaking countries, part-time jobs are often considered an op-
ion for women with family obligations to reconcile work and family
ife. For this reason, results may differ for the different activity levels.
n our experiment, we consider a job to be full-time if the corresponding
ccupation rate of the employee is at least 80%. 
Regarding potential effects of family type, our hypothesis is that em-
loyers will expect parents applying to full-time jobs to have arranged
roper childcare, e.g., via grandparents or other child-minders, as oth-
rwise they would not be able to consider a full-time job. If such ar-
angements are in place, parents are less likely to be absent from work
f a child is sick. In contrast, parents applying to part-time jobs signal
hat they want to reconcile work and family life. Here, in all likelihood,
n case of a sick child, parents themselves will have to look after their
ick children, creating days of absence at work. 
We therefore expect any differences in callback rates between par-
nts with older children and parents with younger children (who have to
eal with more illnesses) to be more pronounced for part-time jobs than
or full-time jobs. Similarly, any potential difference in callback rates
etween childless singles and childless, but married, applicants is also
ikely to be larger for part-time jobs because an employer might take an
pplication of a married woman to a part-time position as a signal of an
ntended pregnancy. 
.3. Other characteristics of the application material 
In the German speaking countries, not only cover letters and a ré-
umé are included in an application, but also certificates and school re-
orts with degree and grade information. These were prepared to signal
he relevant qualification in a good quality. Applicants were currently
mployed with their second employer. To allow us to send two appli-
ations to each firm, two templates were constructed which provided
dentical information with respect to human capital but which differed
n aspects irrelevant to productivity (layout of the application, order
f documents, birthplace, specific school attended of the same branch,
tc.). 
We applied to secretarial and accounting jobs, because clerical jobs
over a large fraction of female employees in the country investigated
nd are therefore empirically relevant. We picked female-dominated
obs because we are interested in whether or not fertility aspects matter
n occupations that are generally open to women. 16 Indeed, a potentially
igh average acceptance rate of women in those jobs is not incompatible
ith preferential behavior toward female candidates credibly signaling
o have low fertility risk in detriment of others unable to provide such a
ignal. Additionally, the labor demand in these jobs was large enough,
o that a reasonably large data set could be collected, and job-profiles
n these occupations are relatively homogeneous, thus allowing us to
ork with standardized applications. Finally, both occupations have a
ubstantial number of full and part-time jobs, allowing us to study and
ompare potential discrimination in both. 
Applications were sent to job vacancies in the largest cities in Ger-
any (Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt and Stuttgart), the
erman-speaking part of Switzerland (Bern, Zurich and Basel), and Aus-
ria (Vienna). 16 In the German-speaking countries, it is difficult to identify male-dominated 
obs with homogeneous qualification requirements and a large enough stream 
f vacancies, which is a precondition for conducting a correspondence test. 
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144 .4. Procedure 
Data collection comprised the period March 2013-June 2015. 17 Over
his period of roughly two years, we sent out application packages con-
isting of a cover letter, a résumé, documents from the relevant educa-
ional institutions with degree and grade information, as well as refer-
nce letters. For “high quality ” applicants, we also included IT and lan-
uage certificates. In all cases, two applications with different templates
ere sent to each company. We randomized the “family/fertility type ”,
ur treatment variable, but also other elements in the résumé such as
he picture and name of the candidate as well as the general template
f the application. 
Applications were sent out to all suitable job advertisements posted
n online job portals. Suitability meant that some filtering was done to
emove, for example, job agencies, likely to keep our profiles in their
ecords for at least some time, or firms that were already included in
ur sample and would likely detect the experiment. Answers from the
mployers were received by email, mobile phone or regular mail (rejec-
ions always came by email or regular mail but invitations sometimes
ere conveyed in the form of voice messages on the answering ma-
hine). Whenever our candidates received an invitation to an interview,
n order to minimize costs for the employer, we quickly declined alleg-
ng that another offer had materialized in the meantime. 18 
. Results 
Our sample comprises nearly 9000 observations, a large sample size
ompared to much of the existing literature related to our study. 19 The
ariable callback measures whether an applicant was invited for an in-
erview. 
Table 1 , panel A illustrates the unconditional probability of receiv-
ng a callback for applications to full-time jobs and shows the marked
ifferences between males and females. While for females, the uncondi-
ional probability of receiving a callback is 19.62%, it is only 11.53% for
ales. When these numbers are disaggregated by occupation, men’s call-
ack rate for secretarial jobs declines to 7.11% whereas the female rate
ecomes 16.45%. In accounting jobs, men receive a callback 16.72%
f the time, whereas the female callback rate is 23.58%. The same pat-
ern of female advantage is found at the country level. These sex differ-
nces in callback rates resonate with other studies surveyed in Riach and
ich (2006) and Rich (2014) concerning discrimination of men in fe-
ale dominated jobs, and of women in male dominated activities. 20 pondence testing as a means to detect discrimination. 
19 We originally collected an even richer set of profiles, but being concerned 
bout multiple measures potentially related to the same information, we focus 
n the profiles described in the previous section. 
20 Nonetheless, there is no complete uniformity in occupations concerning 
hether discrimination negatively affects males or females. While callback deci- 
ions in secretarial jobs tend to disproportionately favor females, in accounting 
ositions males are sometimes preferred (see, e.g., Table 4 in Rich, 2014 ). In 
eichselbaumer (2004) , for example, while women are strongly preferred to 
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Table 1 
Callback rates. 
PANEL A: Full-time Women Men 
Callback rate (in%) Number of observations Callback rate (in%) Number of observations 
All countries 19.62 4245 11.53 2445 
Germany 20.82 2675 13.14 1621 
Switzerland 16.87 1156 9.07 562 
Austria 19.56 414 6.87 262 
Accountants 23.58 1887 16.72 1124 
Secretaries 16.45 2358 7.11 1321 
Single No Kids 20.58 933 11.89 429 
Married No Kids 19.42 937 9.62 405 
Married 2 Young Kids 18.36 719 12.41 588 
Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement Family Completed 17.61 636 
Married 2 Young Kids, Statement Family Completed 24.10 83 
Married 2 Old Kids 19.64 718 13.25 596 
No Info on Family Status 19.83 938 9.37 427 
PANEL B: Part-time Women Men 
Callback rate (in%) Number of observations Callback rate (in%) Number of observations 
All countries 19.22 1332 7.26 647 
Germany 23.59 534 8.51 329 
Switzerland 15.44 693 6.43 280 
Austria 21.90 105 2.63 38 
Accountants 25.56 626 9.22 358 
Secretaries 13.60 706 4.84 289 
Single No Kids 18.77 293 8.11 111 
Married No Kids 13.11 305 5.77 104 
Married 2 Young Kids 20.70 256 8.12 160 
Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement Family Completed 21.83 229 
Married 2 Young Kids, Statement Family Completed 11.11 27 
Married 2 Old Kids 27.18 195 8.04 174 
No Info on Family Status 19.43 283 5.10 98 
Notes: The variable callback measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and 
June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. Application packages consisted of a cover letter, a CV, language certificates, reference 
letters, as well as documents with degree and grade information. In all cases, two applications were sent to each company. We randomized the 
family status/composition, our treatment of interest, but also other elements in the CV such as the picture and name of the candidate as well as the 
general template of the application. (A template determined the general visual aspect of the application and was additionally tied in to a particular 
life story – birthplace, names of schools attended, jobs previously held, references, etc.). 
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s  ne possible explanation for these findings is employer selection based
n gender stereotyping ( Weichselbaumer, 2004 ). 
Turning to the different family types, for both female and male appli-
ants, the differences in callback rates do not seem to be large for appli-
ations to full-time jobs. For women, they range from 18.36% (married,
 young kids) to 20.58% (single, no kids). 21 
Table 1 , panel B shows callback rates for applications to part-time
obs. Interestingly, for women average callback rates are nearly identi-
al to those for full-time jobs (19.22% vs. 19.62%). 22 However, there
s substantially more variation across family types, now ranging from
3.11% for those who are married with no children to 27.18% for those
ho are married with 2 old children. 
.1. Multivariate analysis 
In the following, we present our results from a variety of OLS regres-
ions of the dependent variable “callback ” on a broad set of controls.
n addition to the treatment variables (fertility/family types), all regres-
ions incrementally include controls for variables like city (Bern, Zurich,en in secretarial jobs, in accounting jobs, males and females are called back 
t similar rates. 
21 For the subset of those who were married with 2 young kids and who indi- 
ated in the cover letter to have their “family completed ”, the callback rate was 
omewhat higher (24.1%). As we will see in the regression analysis, though, the 
ifference between applications with and without this sentence is not statisti- 
ally significant. 
22 For men, callback rates are substantially lower in part-time than full-time 
obs (7.26% vs. 11.53%). 
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145 asel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna),
ime (quarter and year) of application sent, application characteristics
nd firm characteristics. Application characteristics include the occupation
secretary vs. accountant), the sex of the applicant, the template and the
icture used in a specific application, the quality of the application (an ap-
lication was of particularly high quality, when IT and English language
ertificates were included), and the quality of the fit of our profile to a
articular vacancy. 23 The firm characteristics capture the sector (public
ector, trade, manufacturing and services sectors), the range of business
ctivity (local/regional, national, international), the firm size as given by
he number of employees (seven dummy variables ranging from “1 to
0” to “more than 1000”), whether the firm was more than 20 km away
rom the applicant’s address ( distance from residence to the workplace ),
s well as whether the firm has an explicit antidiscrimination policy
according to its website). Descriptive statistics are given in Table A.1 . 
.1.1. Full-time jobs 
.1.1.1. No effects of family status and family type. Table 2 shows the re-
ults for the pooled sample of women (i.e., covering all countries), where
e regress the outcome dummy “callback ” on the treatment variables
married w/o kids, married with two young kids, married with two old23 Three dummy variables reflected how well the set of fixed skills possessed 
y our applicants matched the requirements of each specific job ad that we 
nswered. “Good fit ” is a dummy variable coded as one when all the job re- 
uirements were met by our candidates; if our candidates’ qualifications did not 
ully meet the advertisement specifications, they were coded as having an “av- 
rage fit ” (when only minor requirements were not met), or as being a “bad fit ”
when one crucial or two or more minor requirements were not satisfied). 
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Table 2 
Probability of a callback for females applying to full-time jobs, all countries (LPM). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Married No Kids − 0.012 − 0.012 − 0.011 − 0.011 − 0.011 − 0.011 − 0.014 − 0.014 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Married 2 Young Kids − 0.022 − 0.022 − 0.026 − 0.030 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement Family Completed − 0.030 − 0.030 − 0.033 − 0.038 ∗ 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Married 2 Young Kids, Statement Family Completed 0.035 0.035 0.031 0.028 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Married 2 Old Kids − 0.009 − 0.009 − 0.010 − 0.010 − 0.005 − 0.005 − 0.005 − 0.004 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
No Info on Family Status − 0.007 − 0.007 − 0.008 − 0.008 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.003 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
City Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (Year and Quarter) No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application Characteristics No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.206 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.206 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.209 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.209 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.249 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.251 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.280 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.282 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.031) (0.031) (0.045) (0.045) (0.060) (0.060) 
Observations 4245 4245 4245 4245 4245 4245 4233 4233 
R -squared 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.015 0.034 0.034 0.041 0.041 
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. The variable callback measures 
whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. Controls are: City Dummies (Zurich, Basel, 
Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna, Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for when the application 
was sent), Application Characteristics (application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile to vacancy, quality of 
application), Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), sector of activity of the 
company (trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from residence to the workplace). 
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s  ids, no info, default: single w/o kids). We start with regressions that
o not include any control variables. As a result, column 1 essentially
eproduces the descriptive statistics from Table 1. 24 
In column 2, we split the category “individuals with two young kids ”
nto two: those who did or did not include a sentence in the cover letter
hat they have their “family completed ”, i.e. are not intending to have
dditional children. We formally test the equality of these two coeffi-
ients by a t -test ( p -value: 0.19). Based on this, we cannot reject the
ull-hypothesis that they are equal. Thus, adding a sentence on “family
ompletion ” does not lead to significantly different treatment of female
pplicants with two young kids who apply to full-time jobs. 
Subsequent columns control for increasingly richer sets of covariates.
olumns 3 and 4 add city dummies, columns 5 and 6 add application
haracteristics, including year and quarter dummies, columns 7 and 8
dd firm characteristics. 25 
Our first important result from the multivariate analysis is the ab-
ence of statistically significant effects associated with family type
or applications to full-time jobs: employers do not seem respond to
he family situation of job applicants. Given that there is no clear
vidence of discrimination based on one’s family situation in odd-
umbered columns, it does not surprise that the statement on one’s
amily completion does not matter for callback probabilities (even-
umbered columns). 
.1.2. Part-time jobs 
Part-time jobs allow women to reconcile gender norms, which assign
o them the responsibility for child care, with work life. For this reason,
amily type may affect hiring behavior of firms differently when part-
ime jobs are concerned. In particular, women without children apply-
ng for a part-time job may be perceived as planning to become mothers
oon – especially if they are married. We also expect differences con-
erning the outcomes of mothers: While mothers applying to full-time24 Throughout our analysis, standard errors are clustered at the company level. 
25 Throughout, in even-numbered columns, the t-tests of equality of coeffi- 
ients with and without the “family completed ” statement, have p -values larger 
han 0.1, indicating that equality of coefficients cannot be rejected at the 10% 
evel. 
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146 obs must have external childcare arranged, this is not necessarily true
or mothers in part-time jobs. Thus the difference between mothers of
ld children and mothers of young children is expected to be larger in
art-time jobs, because the former are less likely to have to deal with
rgent childcare tasks, e.g., when children are sick. In the following, we
rovide results for part-time jobs (corresponding to a work time of less
han 80%). 
.1.2.1. Effects of family status and family type. Table 3 shows the re-
ults of our multivariate analysis for part-time jobs. The design of the
able follows Table 2 , with the first two columns showing results without
ontrol variables, whereas subsequent columns successively add more
ovariates. 
Being married and childless is associated with a 4–6 percentage
oints lower callback rate, marginally significant in half of our speci-
cations, compared to being single and childless. This finding is consis-
ent with the idea that employers predict that children are imminently
waited, and that the employer may want to avoid pregnancy related
osts. Women with two younger children and those with no information
n family type do not significantly differ from the reference group in
erms of callback rates. According to our even-numbered specifications,
f anything, a married woman with young kids is hurt by the statement
hat she has already completed her family – possibly because it unwant-
dly draws attention to potential future childbearing. 26 However, we
ecommend caution with respect to this result, given that the sample of
omen with such a statement is very small. 
A 30-year old mother of two old children, on the other hand, does not
nly convey the message that she is unlikely to have further children,
ut also that her children are unlikely to require immediate childcare,
or example when being sick. Companies appear to welcome that mes-
age, as callback rates are significantly higher by 8–9 percentage points,
ompared to single and childless women. 
Given average callback rates of 19.22% for applications to part-
ime jobs, our results suggest substantial differences across family26 For specifications 4 and 6, the difference of coefficients is marginally signif- 
cant ( p = 0.08, p = 0.07). 
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Table 3 
Probability of a callback for females applying to part-time jobs, all countries (LPM). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Married No Kids − 0.057 ∗ − 0.057 ∗ − 0.041 − 0.040 − 0.044 − 0.043 − 0.052 ∗ − 0.052 ∗ 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Married 2 Young Kids 0.019 0.037 0.030 0.021 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) 
Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement Family Completed 0.031 0.049 0.043 0.032 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Married 2 Young Kids, Statement Family Completed − 0.077 − 0.066 − 0.075 − 0.069 
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) 
Married 2 Old Kids 0.084 ∗ ∗ 0.084 ∗ ∗ 0.092 ∗ ∗ 0.092 ∗ ∗ 0.080 ∗ ∗ 0.081 ∗ ∗ 0.082 ∗ ∗ 0.082 ∗ ∗ 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
No Info on Family Status 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.003 − 0.008 − 0.007 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
City Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (Year and Quarter) No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application Characteristics No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1332 1332 1332 1332 1332 1332 1327 1327 
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.050 0.052 0.083 0.085 0.102 0.103 
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. The variable callback 
measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. Controls are: City Dummies 
(Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna, Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for when 
the application was sent), Application Characteristics (application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile 
to vacancy, quality of application), Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), 
sector of activity of the company (trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from 
residence to the workplace). 
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e  ypes, with a spread of 12–15 percentage points between married and
hildless women compared to those who are married with two older
ids. 
.1.3. Country-Specific analyses 
Since callback differences by family status have been found only for
art-time, it is fair to ask whether results are driven by one specific
ountry or are common to all three German-speaking countries in our
nalysis. Table 4 presents the respective results. 27 It shows the richest
et of specifications (mirroring columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 ) for Ger-
any, Switzerland, and Austria, separately. The table illustrates that
esults go in the same direction (even if they are less significant due to
he smaller sample sizes) across the three countries, with married, but
hildless women differing markedly in callback rates from women with
wo older children. This is the case even though all three countries have
lear anti-discrimination laws where differential treatment based on sex
r expected motherhood is forbidden. 
.1.4. Secretaries vs. accountants 
Throughout, we pool applicants to secretary and accountant jobs and
nclude a dummy for secretaries (accountant being the default). When
e split the sample by occupation (not reported), we find the same or-
ering of family types for applications to part-time jobs: married and
hildless women have lower callback rates than single childless women,
nd women with two old kids perform better than women with two
oung children. Both in terms of point estimates and in terms of statis-
ical significance, results are somewhat stronger for accountants than
or secretaries, particularly concerning the difference between single
omen and married women with no kids. This is consistent with the idea
hat secretaries can probably be more easily replaced than accountants:
rst, firms might have more secretaries than accountants, making the
atter more pivotal; second, accountants have more specific job-related27 Table A.2 shows country-specific results for full-time jobs. Apart from the 
mall sample size for Austria, the only thing to note is that results across all 
hree countries are very similar to the pooled analysis: we find no evidence for 
 systematic difference in callback rates across family types in any of the three 
erman-speaking countries. 
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147 uman capital which is harder to replace at short notice, should a female
ccountant go on maternity leave or be absent from work. 
.1.5. Male candidates 
Throughout the paper, our focus is on female applicants. Still, male
andidates are an interesting point of comparison in our two female-
ominated occupations. We show the respective results for full-time,
here we have more data, in Table A.3 . 
As we pointed out before, callback rates for men are substantially
ower than for women. However, looking at family types, there is no
iscernible pattern for men neither for full-time nor part-time jobs (not
hown), i.e. firms do not seem to consider information on a male appli-
ant’s family important enough to make use of it for their hiring deci-
ions. 
.2. Effects of the variance of unobservable determinants of productivity 
Heckman and Siegelman (1993) first showed that differences in the
ariance of unobservable productivity determinants may bias the mea-
urement of discrimination: Even in the absence of taste-based discrim-
nation, without group differences in average unobservable characteris-
ics, different variances in unobservable drivers of productivity may lead
o differential treatment due to statistical discrimination. 
Notably, in a correspondence study, the direction of this “variance
ffect ” depends on the quality level of the applicants, i.e., their observ-
ble productivity characteristics, set by the experimenter. For example,
f the quality level of the fictitious candidates is low compared to their
eal-life competitors, an applicant from the group with the higher vari-
nce of unobservable characteristics will be treated more favorably by
rms, because he or she will more likely pass the companies’ quality
hreshold. The reverse is true if the applicants are of high-quality. 
Neumark (2012) developed a method to measure the “variance
ffect ” and obtain an unbiased estimate of discrimination (see also
eumark and Rich, 2019 ), which we apply. 28 Given that in the linear28 Neumark and Rich (2019) use this method to re-assess several published 
tudies of labour market discrimination. They find that with the proposed cor- 
ection, just over half of the estimates of discrimination fall to near zero, become 
tatistically insignificant, or change sign. 
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Table 4 
Probability of a callback for females applying to part-time jobs by country, (LPM). 
Germany Switzerland Austria 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Married No Kids − 0.094 ∗ − 0.093 ∗ − 0.032 − 0.032 − 0.104 − 0.101 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.036) (0.036) (0.136) (0.139) 
Married 2 Young Kids 0.008 0.040 0.054 
(0.063) (0.044) (0.143) 
Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement Family Completed 0.024 0.048 0.097 
(0.065) (0.046) (0.161) 
Married 2 Young Kids, Statement Family Completed − 0.134 − 0.037 − 0.080 
(0.119) (0.078) (0.209) 
Married 2 Old Kids 0.092 0.094 0.072 0.072 0.136 0.136 
(0.068) (0.068) (0.051) (0.051) (0.150) (0.150) 
No Info on Family Status − 0.053 − 0.052 0.027 0.027 0.049 0.055 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.046) (0.046) (0.140) (0.141) 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (Year and Quarter) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.222 0.219 0.193 ∗ 0.187 ∗ − 0.048 0.004 
(0.186) (0.186) (0.109) (0.109) (0.582) (0.585) 
Observations 533 533 689 689 105 105 
R -squared 0.120 0.122 0.098 0.099 0.246 0.251 
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. 
The variable callback measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at 
the company level. Controls are: City Dummies (Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, 
Vienna, Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for when the application was sent), Application Char- 
acteristics (application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile to vacancy, quality of 
application), Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), 
sector of activity of the company (trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination 
policy, distance from residence to the workplace). 
Table 5 
Decomposition results addressing the Heckman–Siegelman critique: comparison of married women without children and 
married women with two old children. 
Part-time Full-time 
All countries All countries 
A. Basic probit model (marginal effects) 0.129 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.006 
(0.033) (0.020) 
B. Heteroskedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
Children 0.011 0.004 
(0.073) (0.021) 
C. Decomposition 
Marginal effect through level (unbiased) 0.246 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.021 
(0.039) (0.076) 
Marginal effect through variance − 0.234 ∗ ∗ − 0.017 
(0.106) (0.081) 
Standard deviation of unobservables: Married two old kids/Married no kids 0.354 0.932 
Wald test statistics: null hypothesis that ratio of standard deviations = 1 ( p -value) 0.001 0.830 
Wald test statistic: null hypothesis that ratio of coefficients are equal 0.992 0.889 
Number of observations 477 1571 
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ ∗ ∗ , p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. 
The variable callback measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at the 
company level. Controls are: Country Dummies (Germany, Switzerland, Austria), Time Dummies (quarter as well as 
year dummies for when the application was sent), Application Characteristics (application template, individual picture 
used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile to vacancy, quality of application), Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm 
size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), sector of activity of the company (trade/wholesale, 
manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from residence to the workplace). 
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f  robability model, for part-time jobs we found the most marked differ-
nces between married women without kids and married women with
lder kids, we focus on the comparison of these groups in the follow-
ng (thus the smaller sample size). As Table 5 , column 1, illustrates, for
art time jobs, in the basic probit, married women with older children
re 13 percentage points more likely to receive a callback than married
omen without children. This result is similar to the findings from the148 inear probability model. However, the Neumark decomposition illus-
rates that this effect is actually underestimated. Married women with
lder children have a lower standard deviation of unobservable vis-à-vis
arried women without children and suffer from a negative “variance
ffect ”. Apparently, the relatively low quality of the experimental can-
idates in this setting has led to a relative advantage for the applicant
rom the higher variance group (the married women without children).
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i  are of this “variance effect ”, the “unbiased level effect ” favoring the
other of older children is even higher than in the linear probability
odel (25 percentage points) and strongly significant, thus confirming
ore favorable treatment of women who have completed fertility (and
ho have little urgent childcare chores), or unfavorable treatment of
omen who likely start childbearing, respectively. 
As before, we do not find any differences between candidates for
ull-time jobs. This finding thus reinforces the conclusion from the linear
robability model that family composition does not appear to be a factor
aken into consideration by employers when making callback decisions
or those jobs. 
. Discussion and conclusion 
In our large-scale correspondence study, we looked at discrimination
n hiring in female-friendly professions. We deliberately picked female-
riendly professions (secretaries and accountants) to avoid comparing
omen to men in occupations where they may be considered less pro-
uctive to begin with. This allowed us to focus on differences in call-
acks among female applicants with varying family profiles. 
Our study has several distinguishing features that set it apart from
he small literature on what we call “fertility discrimination in hiring ”.
e indicate the probability of childbearing as well as childcare chores
y varying information on marriage, presence on children and age of
hildren, while holding applicant age and past work experience con-
tant. The reason why this can be done inconspicuously is that in the
erman-speaking countries, which we examine, this information is rou-
inely given on résumés. Different from earlier research, we send appli-
ations not only to full-time, but also to part-time jobs. 
Our conjecture is that employers consider childless, but married
omen, at particular “risk ” of becoming pregnant. This is in line with
tylized facts based on micro data from the German Socio-Economic
anel (GSOEP) showing that married but childless women are more
ikely to have children than childless singles. Thus, we hypothesize that
arried women without children are less likely to receive a callback
han single women. At the same time, mothers of two young children
re more likely to suffer from child-related absences than mothers of
wo older children. Also this stylized fact is based on GSOEP data. We
herefore hypothesize that mothers of two older children receive more
allbacks than mothers of young children. 
Concerning the difference between candidates applying to full- and
art-time jobs we argue the following: Applicants to part-time jobs con-
ey a desire to reconcile family duties with work. In contrast, applicants
o full-time jobs signal that, independent of their family situation, they
must have ” childcare arrangements in place, because otherwise they
ould not reconcile a full-time job with the logistics of picking up chil-
ren from daycare or school. As a result, we expect differences in call-
acks between mothers of old children vis-à-vis mothers of young chil-
ren to be more pronounced for part-time work. For part-time, we also
xpect stronger differences between single and married women without
hildren. The reason is that a married, but childless woman, who applies
o a part-time job may be considered at a particular “risk ” of becoming
regnant. 
We find that for applicants to full-time jobs, fertility-related in-
ormation actually does not result in different callback rates. 29 Ap-
arently, employers rely on full-time applicants having their family-
elated issues dealt with. This finding is in line with a recent study by
ygren et al. (2017) for Sweden and suggests that discrimination in full-
ime jobs is not based on considerations of potential family formation
r family obligations. 29 We would like to stress that despite our large sample, the fact that, for full- 
ime jobs, differences in callback rates between family types are not statistically 
ignificant, does not preclude that there are differences, as confidence intervals 
re compatible with some differences across types. 
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149 However, in line with our hypotheses, we find stronger differences
ooking at applicants to part-time jobs, where there is substantial vari-
tion in callback rates. Married, but childless women applying to part-
ime jobs have the lowest callback rates, and women with two older chil-
ren the highest. The gap in callback rates between these two groups is
4 percentage points, which is substantial given average callback rates
f 19 percent for part-time jobs. We interpret these findings as presence
f substantial hiring discrimination based on realized and expected fer-
ility for part-time jobs – a possibly surprising result, since these jobs
re typically meant to be particularly family-friendly. 30 
One additional aspect we study is whether mothers of small chil-
ren can signal to employers that they are not intending to have ad-
itional children. In German-speaking countries, it is common to use a
tatement saying “family completed ” to signal that no further pregnan-
ies are planned. We do not find differences in callback rates between
others with two young children who use such statement in their cover
etters compared to those who do not, on conventional statistical levels.
his finding is consistent with the idea that employers consider such
tatements as cheap talk; however, given the relatively small sample of
bservations with such a statement, this interpretation has to be taken
ith caution. 
A lot of progress has been made over the last decades to help equal
reatment of women in the labour market. Although employers’ concerns
elated to realized and expected motherhood are often believed to be the
ey driver for women’s inferior labor market chances, our findings do
ot provide evidence that such a mechanism persists in full-time jobs
n the German-speaking countries today. However, maybe unexpected
or many, our results for part-time jobs illustrate that employers are not
ully immune to considering potential or realized motherhood in female
pplicants, even in female-friendly occupations. 
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ppendix. Parental Leave and Equal Pay Policies in the 
erman-Speaking Countries 
In Germany, paternity leave may be enjoyed by both parents. There
s an initial period of paid leave covering the first 12 months of the30 Another reason why discrimination is higher in part-time jobs may be that 
rms that hire (cheaper) part-time workers may differ from other firms in that 
hey generally (have to) minimize costs more dramatically and therefore are 
ore risk-averse. It could also be that part-time jobs offer little career opportu- 
ity and have a higher turnover than full-time jobs. As a result, employers may 
ave little incentive to take higher risks for hiring the “best ” applicant. 
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Table A.1 
Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Mean Standard deviation 
City Dummies 
Application in Bern 0.067 0.250 
Application in Zurich 0.202 0.401 
Application in Basel 0.041 0.199 
Application in Hamburg 0.106 0.307 
Application in Berlin 0.175 0.380 
Application in Munich 0.103 0.304 
Application in Frankfurt 0.040 0.196 
Application in Cologne 0.100 0.299 
Application in Stuttgart 0.072 0.258 
Application in Vienna 0.094 0.293 
Time Dummies 
Application sent in first quarter 0.154 0.361 
Application sent in second quarter 0.354 0.478 
Application sent in third quarter 0.283 0.450 
Application sent in fourth quarter 0.209 0.407 
Application sent in 2013 0.406 0.491 
Application sent in 2014 0.517 0.500 
Application sent in 2015 0.077 0.266 
Application Characteristics 
Application template 0.500 0.500 
Male applicant 0.357 0.479 
Female picture 1 0.327 0.469 
Female picture 2 0.316 0.465 
Male picture 1 0.173 0.378 
Male picture 2 0.184 0.387 
Advertisement for secretarial job 0.539 0.498 
Applicant is good fit for advertised job a 0.393 0.488 
Applicant is average fit for advertised job b 0.359 0.480 
Applicant is bad fit for advertised job c 0.248 0.432 
Application quality is average d 0.414 0.493 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm’s business activities are local or regional 0.214 0.410 
Firm’s business activities are national 0.410 0.492 
Firm’s business activities are international 0.376 0.485 
Firm has between 0 and 20 employees 0.194 0.396 
Firm has between 21 and 50 employees 0.167 0.373 
Firm has between 51 and 100 employees 0.160 0.367 
Firm has between 101 and 250 employees 0.173 0.379 
Firm has between 251 and 500 employees 0.110 0.313 
Firm has between 501 and 1000 employees 0.067 0.250 
Firm has more than 1000 employees 0.128 0.334 
Firm in the Public sector 0.045 0.208 
Firm in the Trade/Wholesale sector 0.137 0.344 
Firm in the Manufacturing sector 0.193 0.394 
Firm in the Service sector 0.625 0.484 
Distance between home and firm > 20km 0.254 0.435 
Firm with explicit antidiscrimination policy e 0.028 0.166 
Notes: N = 8669, all variables take the value 0 or 1. 
Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a 
correspondence testing field experiment. 
a Applicant fulfills all requirements for advertised position. aby’s life (possibly 14 if both parents take it). The leave can however
e extended without pay up to 3 years. Under some conditions (includ-
ng company size and length of the employment contract), there is the
ossibility to work part-time during the leave. Employment is protected
or the entire duration of the parental leave, and parents have the right
o return to their position before birth or to another one with identical
onditions. 
In Austria, parental leave can last up to two years to be (possibly)
hared by both parents. In addition to the possibility of working part-
ime during the leave, a unique feature of the Austrian system is the
ight to work part-time after the leave, up to the child’s 7th birthday.
ncome is partially covered during the leave and parents get to choose
rom a menu of different compensation possibilities and leave duration.
s in Germany, salary payments during the leave are not borne by the
mployer. Financing of the parental leave systems across the three coun-
ries in our sample is based on contributions that all employers and em-
loyees pay regularly (wage deductions on employees and wage-related
axes born by companies). 
Switzerland offers the shortest period of maternity leave, 14 weeks.
others receive 80% of their former salary during the leave. The em-
loyer has the option to pay the remaining 20% or to prolong the leave
or another 2 weeks, to a total of 16. The law does not require the em-
loyer to accept a reduction in the workload upon the return of the
other, and the company is free to terminate the employment upon the
nd of the leave without any restrictions. Unlike Austria and Germany,
here is no leave for fathers, though unions and companies usually fore-
ee 1–3 days of vacation when the child is born and the possibility to
ake 1 to 3 weeks of unpaid vacation. Given the short work disruption,
he Swiss system is seemingly the least intrusive – unless any disruption
s similarly costly to companies, irrespective of length (e.g., employers
an hire replacement personnel for long-term, but not for short-term
nterruptions). 
Costs from the compliance to the regulations above and adapting
ompany practices to the family situation of employees as a result is
ne argument often heard underlying potential statistical discrimination
gainst women in fertile age. Employers may react by paying women
ower wages, or simply by not hiring them. Indeed, the possibility that
amily policies may backfire and result in negative labour market out-
omes for women in terms of hiring, wages and promotions is well doc-
mented in the literature. 31 
All three German-speaking countries have had legal provisions for
ender equality in pay (‘equal pay for equal work’) for decades. 32 For
xample, all countries have ratified the ILO Equal Remuneration Con-
ention (C100). They have also ratified the Discrimination Convention
C111) and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
rimination Against Women. However, because equal pay has received
ncreasing scrutiny in recent decades, it is possible that employers resort
o hiring instead of wage discrimination, as the former is particularly
ikely to go unnoticed. 33 31 See e.g. Datta et al. (2008) for a discussion of the impact of the generos- 
ty of family policies in Nordic countries on female employment and wages, 
eumark and Stock (2006) on the effects of state equal pay laws in the US on the 
elative employment of black and white females, and Blau and Kahn (2013) for 
n international comparison of the effects of family policies on labor force par- 
icipation and other labor market outcomes of American women vs. those in 
ther countries. 
32 In Germany, Article 3 of the 1949 Constitution (‘Basic Law’) provides for 
qual treatment of all citizens across essentially all areas of life. In Austria, the 
979 Act on Equal Treatment on Men and Women has the same purpose. In 
981, gender equality and equal pay for equal work were written into the Swiss 
onstitution. 
33 In 2006, the Swiss Federal Office for Gender Equality created a tool to as- 
ist companies in evaluating whether or not they were paying equal wages for 
b Applicant lacks only minor requirements for the advertised position. 
c Applicant lacks one major or two minor requirements for the advertised 
position. 
d Application does not include English and IT certificates. 
e An explicit antidiscrimination policy can be found on the company’s 
website. 
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150 dentical work. This policy tool is called logib and allows companies to resort 
o a widely used spreadsheet software to run a regression and evaluate the fair- 
ess of their pay structure by checking the sign and statistical significance of 
he coefficient on a gender dummy. Germany (with logib -d) and Austria (with 
ww.gehaltsrechner.gv.at ) soon followed suit in devising and implementing 
imilar policy tools. Vaccaro (2018) evaluated the success of the Swiss logib 
n reducing the gender wage gap (GWG) and found that this policy tool has led 
o a decline of 3.5pp in the unexplained part of the GWG, but of only 1.5pp on 
he raw wage gap. 
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Table A.2 
Probability of a callback for females applying to full-time jobs by countries, (LPM). 
Germany Switzerland Austria 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Married No Kids − 0.013 − 0.013 − 0.019 − 0.018 0.032 0.032 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.057) (0.057) 
Married 2 Young Kids − 0.024 − 0.031 − 0.018 
(0.026) (0.035) (0.056) 
Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement Family Completed − 0.029 − 0.040 − 0.030 
(0.026) (0.035) (0.060) 
Married 2 Young Kids, Statement Family Completed 0.019 0.052 0.033 
(0.064) (0.099) (0.095) 
Married 2 Old Kids 0.001 0.001 − 0.039 − 0.039 0.093 0.093 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036) (0.063) (0.063) 
No Info on Family Status 0.005 0.005 − 0.031 − 0.031 0.054 0.054 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.062) (0.062) 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (Year and Quarter) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.319 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.321 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.414 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.417 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.020 − 0.021 
(0.087) (0.087) (0.090) (0.090) (0.125) (0.125) 
Observations 2671 2671 1148 1148 414 414 
R -squared 0.044 0.044 0.070 0.071 0.106 0.107 
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. 
The variable callback measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at the 
company level. Controls are: City Dummies (Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna, 
Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for when the application was sent), Application Characteristics 
(application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile to vacancy, quality of application), 
Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), sector of activity 
of the company (trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from 
residence to the workplace). 
Table A.3 
Probability of a callback for males applying to full-time jobs by country, (LPM). 
All Countries Germany Switzerland Austria 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Married No Kids − 0.023 − 0.023 − 0.041 − 0.045 0.014 0.028 0.002 − 0.024 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.043) (0.041) (0.048) (0.056) 
Married 2 Young Kids 0.005 0.001 − 0.010 − 0.014 0.048 0.059 − 0.022 − 0.040 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) 
Married 2 Old Kids 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.019 0.002 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.037) (0.038) (0.048) (0.052) 
No Info on Family Status − 0.025 − 0.026 − 0.030 − 0.028 − 0.056 ∗ − 0.050 0.055 0.052 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) (0.052) (0.055) 
City Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time Dummies (Year and Quarter) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Application Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.119 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.148 ∗ ∗ 0.142 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.158 0.087 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.199 ∗ ∗ 0.059 ∗ 0.086 
(0.016) (0.058) (0.023) (0.098) (0.028) (0.083) (0.033) (0.080) 
Observations 2445 2440 1621 1620 562 558 262 262 
R -squared 0.002 0.044 0.003 0.046 0.013 0.092 0.009 0.111 
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. 
The variable callback measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at the 
company level. Controls are: City Dummies (Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna, 
Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for when the application was sent), Application Characteristics 
(application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile to vacancy, quality of application), 
Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), sector of activity 
of the company (trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from 
residence to the workplace). 
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